How the Korean War Shaped Our Changing National Security Landscape

Posted January 5, 2016

On December 1, 2015, the Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy (CISTP), the research arm of the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, co-hosted with the School of History and Sociology “Changing National Security Landscape, 1945 - 1953: The Ray Davis 1938 Legacy Symposium.”

The symposium honored the legacy of the late alumnus General Raymond G. Davis, as well as the 65th anniversary of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, where General Davis earned his Medal of Honor. It also focused on the Korean War and how that conflict shaped the U.S. national security landscape at the beginning of the Cold War.

Keynote speaker, General James L. Jones, a former National Security Advisor and 32nd Commandant of the United States Marine Corps (USMC), served as General Davis’ aide de camp.  Jones brought Davis to life through candid remarks about him and the impression Davis left on those who served with him.

Speaker Melvyn P. Leffler, Edward Stettinius Professor of History at the University of Virginia, discussed the historical context of the Korean War relative to the evolution of the Cold War and the emergence of the national security state. He asserted that the period between 1950 and 1953 was extraordinarily significant in shaping the Cold War and the institutionalization of the national security state. Leffler noted three key supports for this.  First, that the Korean War institutionalized the arms race and made it a way of life for the next four decades; second, that the national security state was consolidated in terms of the institutional and bureaucratic mechanisms of the American government; and third, that the Korean War led to the globalization of the Cold War, expanding it from Europe (where many thought it was being waged) to the East and Southeast Asia.

Colonel Mackubin Owens, USMC, Retired, the Dean of Academics of the Institute of World Politics (IWP) in Washington, D.C., discussed specifics of the war noting that the U.S. wasn’t prepared for it. He stated that this was a “limited” war from the U.S. perspective compared to the “unlimited” war that was World War II. Owens said the war was limited for several reasons: it served as a diversion for a main Soviet attack against NATO in Europe; there were complications that arose from the unification of U.S. armed forces and subsequent issues; and there was a lack of budgetary support to fund a serious effort to face a heightened Cold War. 

John Garver, Professor Emeritus in the Nunn School discussed China’s role in the Korean War, pointedly stating that the Chinese fervently believe that they won the war due to their ability to halt the United States’ advance and force a full withdrawal. He further indicated that China’s intervention in the war was Mao’s decision, and because that contradicted the advice of Stalin, furthered China’s stature as an emerging power.

The symposium concluded with a panel highlighting the legacy of the Korean War and questions from the audience. Questions covered topics such as the specific breakdown of units involved in combat, implications following the conclusion of the war, and how the Republic of Korea evolved in the decades following the war.

For more information please contact Chris McDermott at chris.mcdermott@gatech.edu